The Weekly Reflektion 31/2024
Carrying out a risk assessment requires identification of likely hazards and threats and how these can be mitigated to ensure the future is safe. Some hazards and threats may be considered to be unlikely that the risks are not assessed. Some hazards and threats are not thought about at all. This is where our creativity becomes important.
Do you consider the unthinkable in your risk assessements?
Last week’s Reflektion concerned risk assessments and how we should include ‘unthinkable’ risks in the preparation for an operation. A key element in risk assessment is being creative enough to break away from the usual risks and let your mind wander to consider the things that probably won’t happen, but may have consequences that are severe for you, your organization, or your country.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, China, one of the main suppliers of the raw materials needed for many medicines, experienced an almost total shutdown of production of these raw materials, causing a shortage of many medicines worldwide. Very few countries were prepared for this eventuality, hopefully they have learned and are more prepared now.
Reflekt has used the term ‘premortem’ in past Reflektions, where an attempt is made to create a chain of events that may have serious consequences so that you can evaluate how prepared you are for handling these events and their consequences. We have been bombarded in recent weeks with news reports concerning the USA election this November. The result of this election could have serious consequences for the rest of the world, and we have performed a ‘premortem’ to assess how well prepared we are.
The chain of events are as follows:
– Republicans win the USA election
– Monetary and arms support to Ukraine is stopped or reduced significantly
– Republicans confirm that they will no longer commit to following NATO Article 5 (reportedly already discussed in the GOP)
o Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.
– Ukraine accepts a cease fire with Russia under pressure from the USA conceding 20% of their country to Russia
– Sanctions on Russia are dropped under pressure from the USA
– The European countries and NATO are left alone to contain further Russia aggression
– Russia attacks and annexes countries of the former Soviet Union that are not members of NATO
– Russia attacks neighbouring countries irrespective of whether they are members of NATO or not.
– One or more of these countries are unable to withstand the Russian aggression and are occupied by Russian forces
The questions that this ‘premortem’ raises are interesting. Can NATO and/or the EU rely on support from the USA in an article 5 situation? If not, how should NATO and the EU, as well as each individual country prepare themselves for this dystopian future? Is 2% of GDP spending on NATO from each member enough? What technical and organizational barriers should be put in place, and in what time frame? Risk management is required at many levels in our world.
On 24th June 2024 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), who are charged with investigating the incident, issued an investigative update. The NTSB emphasised that no conclusions on the causes of the incident have been made.
Three minutes before the collision, a primary electrical breaker tripped causing a blackout. The single diesel engine shutdown automatically and the ship lost propulsion and there was no power to move the rudder. At this time the ship was travelling at 9 knots and about three ship lengths from the bridge. The crew restored electrical power and the pilot onboard called for assistance from tugboats in the area and ordered the anchor dropped. A second blackout occurred, and a VHF marine radio call was made to warn waterborne traffic. The pilot’s dispatcher called the duty police officer to inform them of the situation. Two minutes before the collision the bridge was closed to all traffic. When the ship hit the southern pier, the inspector was walking along the bridge and managed to run to safety. The seven construction workers were in their vehicles and fell with them into the water. Only one managed to free himself and was rescued by a police boat at 0155 hrs.
There were some electrical problems on the Dali when it was in port at Baltimore, however how relevant these were for the subsequent problems is not yet clear. The NTSB planned areas of investigation include oceangoing vessels’ propulsion and electrical systems; the frequency and causes of vessel contacts with bridges over navigable waters; and bridge-strike mitigation measures such as a combination of vessel-size restrictions, vessel-assist tugs, and bridge-pier protection.
Stopping all traffic over a bridge each time a large vessel passes seems unrealistic. Similarly, stopping any maintenance work on the bridge. The primary risk mitigation is to ensure vessels do not lose control and threaten the bridge integrity. Loss of control is however not unthinkable and therefore contingency measures including emergency response procedures must be in place.